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1. INTRODUCTION

The Group of Twenty (G20) was originally created in 1999 in the wake of the Asian financial crisis as a forum of finance ministers and central bank governors of the major industrial and emerging market countries with the aim of identifying and discussing financial vulnerabilities. At the height of the global financial crisis in fall 2008, the G20 countries began also meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government. The aim of the G20 Leaders was to be ‘the focal point for global economic governance’ (Drezner 2014: 142). In contrast to other international institutions where the European Union (EU) has no official representation or only has observer status, the EU is a full member of the G20. At the Ministerial level, the EU is represented by the Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs and the rotating Presidency of the Council. At the Leaders level, which is the object of investigation in this study, the EU is represented by the Commission President and European Council President. In addition to these actors, there are four EU countries that are members of the G20: Germany, France, Italy and the UK. Spain attends the G20 Leaders in the capacity of a permanent invitee. In short, EU is represented through a ‘hybrid’ model that falls in between classical Community delegation and pure intergovernmental approaches (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1998).

Hybrid models of representation are usually regarded as particularly problematic for the EU’s ability to ‘speak with one voice’ (or more accurately, to formulate a common position in preparation to international negotiations).​[1]​ This is the case because the segmentation of EU representation in international fora, where the largest member states have their representatives next to the agents for the EU, creates incentives for differentiation, even when there is a common underlying view (Bini Smaghi 2004, 242). If member states preferences are fundamentally different EU cohesiveness is usually considered very difficult to be attained especially in the absence of ‘exclusive competence’ and of legally-binding mechanisms designed to foster the formation a common position (Hodson 2011; Mügge 2011a; Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 2014).  

This paper empirically investigates these arguments  by assessing whether the homogeneity of preferences of the largest member states is required for EU cohesiveness to materialize ahead of the G20 meetings. In particular, the paper examines the economic preferences of France, Germany and the UK against the content of the EU-agreed negotiating stance in the G20 Leaders meetings that took place from 2008 to 2012. The analysis focuses on the three main economic dossiers that have characterized the G20 Leaders agenda since its creation, namely: 1) financial regulation, 2) fiscal policy coordination and 3) macroeconomic imbalances. 

The paper argues that preference homogeneity is not a necessary condition for EU cohesiveness. Homogeneous preferences favor the highest degree of cohesiveness in terms of shared goals and instruments. However, the EU has displayed medium levels of cohesiveness on issues and at times when the economic preferences of the large member states were fundamentally different. Hence, a single voice can be developed and publicly articulated even if the preferences of the large member states are heterogeneous, provided that the issues under negotiations are not politically salient.  The paper does not find support for the propositions that the cohesiveness of the EU  is crafted by the entrepreneurial activity of the European Commission, which however performs a coordinating role. Indeed, it is up to the Commission to prepare the draft of the agreed language that is negotiated by the member state​[2]​ and it is the Commission, via its Sherpa, that takes the lead for the EU in the G20 negotiations (Debaere and Orbie 2012).​[3]​ 

The analysis thus contributes to the literature on EU cohesiveness in a number of respects. Several studies have highlighted how different levels of disagreement among EU member states combined with the legal allocation of competences for the external representation impact on the EU external influence (for instance Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 2014). Our approach moves further by offering an assessment of the impact of the economic preferences of the largest member states within the framework of a hybrid model of external representation and identifying an intervening variable, namely political salience, that mediate the impact of preference heterogeneity. We also contribute to the scholarly debate on EU cohesiveness (see the special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy, 2014) by investigating an international setting – the G20 – that has thus far received only limited attention in EU scholarship (for some notable exceptions, see Nasra & Debaere 2012; Wouters, Van Kerckhoven, Odermatt 2013).

Before proceeding, some clarifications are in order concerning the aims of the paper and the selection of the policies that were object of the G20 negotiations. The paper sets out to investigate whether or to what extent preference heterogeneity among the large member states constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to EU cohesiveness in a hybrid model of EU external representation. It is however beyond the purpose of the research to provide a full-blown analysis of national preference formation in France, Germany and the UK and to establish the sources of national preferences (for some recent works on the ideational or material foundations of national preferences with reference to the G20 see Schirm 2013).  Furthermore, the paper focuses on three specific economic issues dealt with by the G20 Leaders since its creation in 2008, namely financial regulation, fiscal policy and macroeconomic imbalances. These issues were selected for both pragmatic and methodological reasons: they are the issues that have occupied the top list of the G20 agenda at the height of the global financial crisis and for which data are the most extensive. Furthermore, the preferences of the largest EU member states and the level of political salience vary on these issues, thus allowing us to assess their impact. 

This paper develops its arguments in three steps. Section 2 reviews the literature on EU cohesiveness and discuss the variables that are used in this study. Section 3 provides an empirical illustration of how preference heterogeneity and political salience affected the level of EU cohesiveness in financial regulation, fiscal policy and macroeconomic imbalances. The concluding section summarizes and discusses the main findings. 

2. Research design and methodology 

What factors account for the cohesiveness of the EU in international negotiations? Several studies answer this question by emphasizing the institutional mechanisms that help to aggregate member states preferences (Conceição-Heldt 2014, 2010; Meunier  2014). That is to say, cohesiveness is expected to be very high if the EU has exclusive competence on a certain policy area, and increasingly lower if a certain policy is subject to EU mixed competences or to national competence with the EU performing a coordinating role. The comparison between trade and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is often used to illustrate this view. Whereas in trade, the European Commission negotiates as agent for the EU, hence ‘Europe formally “speaks with one voice”’ (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999, 478), the CFSP ‘has consisted of little more than sporadic attempts to issue common declarations in response to external crises’ (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 1999: 478). 

A corollary of this argument is that in so-called hybrid models of EU external representation where some EU members have their representatives next to the agents for the EU, the prospects for cohesiveness are gloom (Muegge 2011a; Meunier and McNamara 2002). Or at the very least, preference heterogeneity undermines EU cohesiveness because it is usually associated with agreements at the ‘lowest common denominator’ (Macaj and Nicolaïdis 2014: 1074). As argued by Hodson (2011) ‘heterogeneous preferences between national governments on international issues will make it more difficult for the EU to speak with one voice’. In this paper, we build on these skeptical views about the prospect for EU cohesiveness by investigating the effect of preference heterogeneity on the development and articulation of a single voice. 

The preferences whose impact is analyzed in this study are those of the three largest member states that have a seat at the G20 Leaders, namely France, Germany and the UK. The case selection builds on an extensive body of scholarship that has demonstrated how the patterns of European integration and specific policy outcomes cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration the preferences and intergovernmental bargaining amongst the three largest member states (for the traditional articulation of this view see Moravcsik 1998). In the case under investigation, then, the preferences of the largest countries are particularly important because they have their own representative sitting next to the Presidents of the EC and European Council. Furthermore, several authors have argued that the largest member states, given their economic and political weight, tend to have a preponderant influence in the formation of the EU common positions in the G20 (Nasra and Debeare 2012; Rommerskirchen 2013). As Nasra et al. (2009: 6) point out, in the preparatory meetings, EU large member states ‘remain in control of the whole coordination effort in the EU’. 

In order to ascertain the influence exerted by France, Germany and the UK on the formation of the EU common voice, we provide an inductive reconstruction of the economic preferences of these countries on financial regulation, macroeconomic imbalances and fiscal policy from 2008 to 2012. In particular, we adopt a ‘revealed’ preferences approach in that preferences are ascertained based on what policy makers said as reported in press coverage and interviews. This exercise also allows appreciating the commonalities and differences of MSs views on the goals the EU should pursue in a specific area of activity as well as on the instruments through which to achieve the goals, that is to say, the extent of preference heterogeneity. Of course, this approach leaves open the question of what factors shaped national preferences in the first place as well as their evolution over time. Nevertheless, our purpose here is to identify major trends in the relationship between states preferences and EU cohesiveness. 

In order to account for different levels of cohesiveness, the theoretical expectations that guide the empirical analysis, as derived from the literature discussed above, are the following: 1) EU cohesiveness is likely to be high if the preferences of the three largest member states on a given issue are largely homogenous; 2) EU cohesiveness is unlikely to materialize if the preferences of the three largest member states on a given issue are largely heterogeneous. But how to account for medium levels of cohesiveness? Here our theoretical expectation can be summarized as follows: 3) EU cohesiveness is likely to be medium if the preferences of member states on a specific issue are heterogeneous  but that issue is not politically salient.

In other words, borrowing from scholars who have examined issue salience in public policy (see the pioneering work of Jones and Baumgartner 2005) we introduce an intervening variable, namely political salience, which mediates the effects of preference heterogeneity on EU cohesiveness. Following insights from Culpepper (2011) and Pagliari (2013), the political salience of financial regulation, fiscal policy and macroeconomic imbalances is operationalised by looking at press coverage over time. In a nutshell, the more a certain topic is mentioned in the press, the higher its political salience. We focus on the Financial Times, which has broad European and international diffusion, with a view to gauging how many articles per year mentioned these topics between 2008 and 2012 (for a similar methodology see Culpepper 2011 and Pagliari 2013). Since the words ‘financial regulation’ and ‘fiscal policy’ generated unlimited returns, we used as search terms ‘financial crisis’ and ‘debt crisis’. We further narrowed the search to articles that mentioned these terms at least three times and five times in order to identify articles that contain an in-depth discussion of these topics rather than just an occasional mention. This search parameter is not applied to the keyword search  ‘balance of payments crisis’ as it generates 0 returns.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]


Regardless of the choice of the search parameter, the trend is clear. The political salience of the financial crisis (hence, of financial regulation) peaked from late 2008 to the end of 2009, it began declining in 2010; and declined further in 2011 and 2012, when it was 4 times lower than 2009. The political salience of the debt crisis (hence fiscal policy) went from a couple or no mentions in 2008-2009 to a significant number in 2010, peaking in 2011, declining afterward (see Table 1). The political salience of the balance of payments crisis (hence macroeconomic imbalances) peaked in 2008-9, declined in 2010, and gradually increased afterwards. In this analysis, salience is treated as a uniform phenomenon, defined by newspapers attention to a given issue. However, it might well be that issue salience varies between member states, in which case one would except less willingness to compromise by the that the national authorities of the country in which issue salience is higher, making cohesiveness more difficult to achieve than it would otherwise be the case.

As for the dependent variable, the paper adopts a narrow definition of cohesiveness that echoes the concept of internal cohesiveness developed by Conceição-Heldt and Meunier (2014: 966), according to whom ‘internal cohesiveness’ refers to ‘whether the member states can formulate a common position in spite of their divergences’. Unlike Conceição-Heldt and Meunier, however, we do not conceive cohesiveness in terms of ‘the decision-making rules which make it possible to aggregate member states’ preferences into a collective position’ (Conceição-Heldt and Meunier 2014: 967) because we acknowledge that actual behaviour may differ from the rule that constrains it (see Macaj and Nicolaïdis 2014: 1069 on this point).​[4]​  

Based on these insights, cohesiveness is operationalized in terms of the content of the European Council Conclusions where the EU negotiating stance in the G20 summits is formally agreed.​[5]​ Specifically, when the agreed language contains indication on both the objectives and policy instruments that the EU is expected to pursue in the G20 meetings, the document is coded as an example of high cohesiveness. If the agreed language contains contain information on policy objectives but not on instruments, the document is coded as an instance of medium cohesiveness. Finally, the agreed language is coded as an instance of no cohesiveness when its content does not provide indication as to what the EU position is on an issue that is part of the forthcoming G20 agenda.

Borrowing from Hall (1993: 278) objectives are defined as ‘the overarching goals that guide policy in a particular field’, whereas instruments are the tools or ‘techniques used to attain those goals’. Hence, for example, the reduction of macroeconomic imbalances is an objective, whereas quantitative thresholds for exports or the floating of the exchange rate are instruments. With a view to avoiding a too simple and reductive reading of the EU position, the ‘agreed language’ is crossed checked with other sources, including the letters of Presidents of the Commission and of the Council after the discussion among member states, semi-structured elite interviews with senior officials from the Commission, the Presidency of the European Council and national representatives in Brussels. These interviews, together with a systematic survey of press coverage, were instrumental in order to gather a better understanding of the processes of intra-EU coordination as well as the preferences of the main players. Finally, access to undisclosed documents of the Council General Secretariat was secured.


3. Member states’ preferences, political salience and EU cohesiveness at the G20 Leaders

In this section, we assess the interplay of preference heterogeneity and political salience on EU cohesiveness in the preparation of the G20 summits from 2008 to 2012. The analysis is broken down according to the issues under negotiation. 

3.1 Financial regulation

At the first three G20 Leaders meetings, the EU had a highly cohesive position on financial regulation, that is to say, the content of the agreed language contained clear indications concerning the EU negotiating stance in terms of both the policy objectives and instruments through which to fix the working of financial markets and actors. For instance, the Washington 2008 agreed language stated that ‘No financial institution, no market segment and no jurisdiction must escape proportionate and adequate regulation or at least oversight’ (emphasis added) (European Council 2008). Similarly, the London 2009 agreed language called for ensuring ‘appropriate regulation and oversight of all financial markets, products and participants that may present a systemic risk, without exception and regardless of their country of domicile’ (European Council 2009a).

EU commitment to these goals was accompanied with agreement on the tools through which to pursue them.  For instance, the 2008 agreed language presented a specific set of instruments that included ‘surveillance and rules of governance for [credit rating agencies] CRA’; the ‘convergence of accounting standards’, reviewing the ‘application of fair value’ principles; and the establishment of ‘codes of conduct to avoid excessive risk-taking in the financial sector’. Similarly, the agreed language for the London summit called for new rules on ‘hedge funds, private equity… and credit derivatives’ (European Council 2009a). 

In the preparation for the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009, the cohesiveness of the EU position remained high. Indeed, in the agreed language, the member states re-stated the need to improve the international financial regulatory architecture. They also noted the need to strengthen the supervision of systemically important financial institutions. Specific policy instruments were identified such as tailor-made stress tests, contingency plans and capital buffers. Furthermore, in line with the previous agreed language, the EU emphasized the need to develop a macroprudential supervisory approach as a means to improve financial sector oversight (EU Council 2009b). 

In short, in 2008-2009, there was significant agreement concerning the objective of securing financial stability by expanding the perimeter of financial regulation and the instruments needed to achieve these objectives. At first sight, the high level of EU cohesiveness on financial regulation could be explained by the EU internal regulatory response to the financial crisis, such as the adoption of EU regulation on rating agencies and hedge funds (Moschella 2011; Pagliari 2013) or of the EU macroprudential institutional set up (Hennessy 2014). However, the EU agreed language also went beyond the EU internal agenda. An example was the reference to the need to regulate over the counter derivatives, whereby at that time the Commission had not yet proposed legislation on this issue. In short, there was not neat correspondence between the level of EU cohesiveness and internal regulatory developments in the EU.   

The high level of cohesiveness reflects instead the homogeneity of the policy preferences of the three largest EU member states on the need to (re)regulate financial markets and actors through a rule-based approach away from self-regulation and market discipline. For instance, Germany and France, which well before the breaking out of the crisis had called for the extension of the perimeter of EU and international regulation to certain financial entities and products, became even more vocal in their advocacy for a market-shaping approach to financial regulation (Financial Times, 13 March 2009; Quaglia 2010). In the run up to the G20 Leaders meeting in London, Markel and Sarkozy sent a joint letter to the Presidency of the EU and the European Commission arguing that ‘the European Union must assert a common position and take the lead … on strengthening international financial regulation. . . . The European Union must propose that all hedge funds and other funds presenting a potential systemic risk be subject to appropriate registration, regulation and oversight’ (Merkel and Sarkozy 2009a). At the joint press conference at G20 Leader summit in London, Merkel and Sarkozy (2009b) pointed out that ‘Germany and France … will be speaking with a single voice. Our objectives are the same both on the principles and the way to proceed… Germany and France, want, in the summit’s results, the principle of new regulation to be a major objective… we have agreed on the same red lines: tax havens, securitization, hedge funds, credit rating agencies’.​[6]​

As for the UK preferences, the crisis marked the beginning of a reassessment of policy-makers preferences (Quaglia 2012). Indeed, British policymakers had traditionally been the main supporter of a ‘light-touch’ approach to financial regulation at the national, EU and international levels (Muegge 2011b), also reflecting the large contribution of the financial sector to the UK economy. As a result, the UK had long favored rules that facilitated rather than restricted financial activities, opposing the extension of the perimeter of regulation to hedge funds and credit rating agencies which, at that time, were subject to self-regulation (Fioretos 2010; Pagliari 2010). After the crisis, however, UK policy-makers partly questioned the previous market-making regulatory approach, as noted in the influential review issued by the British Financial Services Authority (FSA) (the so-called ‘Turner review’, FSA 2009; see also Financial Times, 19 March 2009). As the Turner Review acknowledged (FSA 2009: 38–39), the global financial crisis robustly challenged – on ‘both theoretical and empirical grounds’ – the existing ‘regulatory philosophy’ and the ‘intellectual assumptions’ of ‘efficient’, ‘rational’ and ‘self-correcting markets’ on which it was based. The UK’s repositioning on why and how to regulate financial markets thus moved it closer to the positions of France and Germany (Quaglia 2012). 

Whereas the level of cohesiveness on the perimeter of financial regulation was high, no common position materialized on the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT), e.g. there was no agreement on the objective of the proposed tax, for example, to curb speculative finance or as an extra source of revenue, nor on the instruments to collect the tax. And this outcome stands in stark contrast to the EU Commission strong advocacy in favor of the FTT. As the President of the Commission put it, ‘I want the financial sector to play a part in this. That is why the EU should remain committed to push for a financial transaction tax at a global level’ (Barroso 2010). These points were further stressed in the joint letter prior to the G20 Leaders meeting in Seoul (Barroso and Van Rompuy 2010). In the run-up to the G20 Leaders summit in Los Cabos, Barroso claimed that ‘we [in Europe] want a Financial Transaction Tax to become a reality in Europe and, if possible, at a global level’. 

In spite of the Commission entrepreneurship on this issue, the EU agreed language for the G20 Leaders meeting used rather non-committal language. It read, ‘The introduction of a global financial transaction tax should be explored and developed further’ (European Council 2010a, emphasis added). By the time of the Cannes summit, the FTT was not included in the section where the Heads of State and Government set the EU position ahead of the summit. Instead, it was simply noted under other items in the agenda that ‘The European Council takes note of the Commission proposal for a financial transaction tax’ (European Council 2011). There was no reference at all to the FTT in the agreed language for Los Cabos (European Council 2012).

The lack of cohesiveness on the FTT largely reflects heterogeneous national preferences. France and Germany, together with the European Commission, were the main promoters of the FTT in the EU and internationally (Reuters, 4 November 2011). As Merkel declared, ‘Germany and France both equally view the financial transaction tax as a correct response’ (Bloomberg, 9 January 2012). And President Sarkozy even announced the possibility of unilaterally introducing a FTT in France (BBC, 30 January 2012). By contrast, the UK, opposed the FTT on the ground that it would be detrimental to international financial centers, such as the City of London and Wall Street, which mostly operate in the wholesale market (Financial Times, 23 September 2011; Reuters, 4 November 2011). Indeed, several reports (House of Lords 2012; London Economics 2014) indicated that up to 80% of the FTT in the EU would be collected in the UK. Moreover, there was the possibility that part of the taxes collected in the UK would be transferred to the EU and/or shared with other EU countries, which hosted firms that were party to financial transactions taking place in the UK (House of Lords 2012). Chancellor Osborne went so far as arguing that the ‘financial transaction tax is not a tax on banks or bankers; it is a tax on pensioners and people with savings and investments’ (BBC, 20 April 2013). Eventually, the UK government brought the case before the European Court of Justice, which dismissed the UK's challenge as premature because the details of the tax had not been finalized (Financial Times, 6 May 2014).

3.2 Fiscal policy 

In preparation for the 2009 London summit,​[7]​ the main macroeconomic issue in the G20 agenda was the fiscal stimulus required to insulate the real economy from the adverse effects of the global financial crisis. In this respect, EU preparatory documents reveal a high degree of cohesiveness in terms of objectives and instruments. The agreed language stressed the objective of ‘international coordination of fiscal stimulus’ through the instrument of ‘swiftly planned fiscal stimulus packages’. Barroso well summarizes this agreement, noting that, ‘The EU is already doing a lot on this front; our overall fiscal effort is close to 4% of GDP’ (Barroso 2009). 

The high level of agreement reflects the largely homogenous preferences of France, Germany and the UK due to the similar economic conditions that were experiencing at the time. For instance, although Germany had traditionally supported stability-oriented economic policies (Dyson 2000), this position was moderated in the wake of the global financial crisis and the economic recession that accompanied it (Financial Times, 14 November 2008). At the joint press statement by Merkel and Sarkozy at the G20 summit in London, they argued ‘We well understand the need to put fuel [into the engine] and we’ve done so. Germany and France have played their full part in the stimulus, that goes without saying’.​[8]​ The UK, in turn, was the first country to announce a substantial fiscal stimulus in October 2008, when Chancellor Alistair Darling explicitly stated that ‘much of what Keynes wrote still makes sense’ (The Guardian 20 October 2008). 

As the crisis wore on, the level of EU cohesiveness in the G20 started to decrease. This happened as soon as a decision had to be taken on the path to fiscal sustainability. On this issue, in contrast to fiscal stimulus, the constellation of domestic preferences was heterogeneous. Fiscal adjustment was mainly advocated by Germany, but resisted by France, which insisted on considering some ‘discretion’ in the path toward fiscal sustainability, as elaborated below. The UK, after the change of government in May 2010, moved close to the German position on this matter. The agreed language in preparation for the Pittsburgh summit reflected this difference of views where it states that ‘Exit strategies need to be designed now and implemented in a coordinated manner as soon as recovery takes hold, taking into account the specific situations of individual countries’ (European Council, 2009b, emphasis added). The call for a ‘differentiated exit strategy to ensure sustainable public finances’ (European Council 2010a, emphasis added) was also present in the agreed language in preparation for the G20 in Toronto. 

For the purposes of this study, what matters is not as much the reorientation from fiscal support to fiscal sustainability but rather its implications for the cohesiveness of the EU, which now became medium. Indeed, while the preparatory documents show agreement on the objective of fiscal sustainability, EU member states could not agree on its timing and instruments, that is, on whether to prioritize measures that would stimulate economic growth, thus generating additional tax revenues, or measures of fiscal retrenchment combined with structural reforms. This ambiguity was well illustrated in President Barroso’s speeches ahead of the Toronto summit, where fiscal adjustment and economic growth were both listed in the do-list (Barroso 2010a). In particular, as the issue on the table became fiscal sustainability, preferences diverged because Germany and the newly elected UK government prioritized measures based on spending cuts and structural reforms (The Guardian, 22 June 2010, BBC news, 20 October 2010), whereas France prioritized measures to support economic growth (Financial Times, 4 June 2010, 6 June 2010) as a means to restore long-term fiscal sustainability.

The German stance is well illustrated by Finance minister Schauble’s (2010) speech to the International Monetary and Financial Committee in 2010 where he argued that ‘Against the background of increasing public deficits and debt, it is of high importance to reinforce confidence in the credibility and long-term sustainability of public finances.’ In this spirit, Chancellor Merkel called for an ‘internationally coordinated exit strategy’ from fiscal support measures (Wall Street Journal, 21 January 2010). The French position was much more skeptical about the reversal of the previously agreed fiscal stance instead. Indeed, French policymakers cautioned against quick exit strategies, pointing out that these strategies had to be differentiated across countries (Financial Times, 23 June 2010).  This position largely reflects domestic policy priorities: Treasury Minister Lagarde argued that France would ‘tiptoe’ out its stimulus plan (Financial Times, 24 June 2010) and that although fiscal consolidation was imperative ‘We need to be careful to avoid brutal shifts’ (Financial Times, 4 June 2010). As for the UK, the Lib-Cons government that took office in May 2010 became the herald of fiscal adjustment also with the aim to differentiate itself from the previous Labour administration (The Guardian, 22 June 2010). Shortly after its election British Prime Minister David Cameron emphatically declared that ‘to reduce the deficit and cut down on borrowing were the most urgent issue facing Britain today’ (New York Times, 7 June 2010, see also Cameron 2010). 

As noted above, in spite of these divergent preferences, the EU was nonetheless able to forge a medium level of cohesiveness in preparation of the G20 summits in 2009 and the first half of 2010. This outcome seems closely associated with the political salience that the issue of the sustainability of public finances had in the period, as suggested by Table 1. Indeed, fiscal sustainability became politically salient only in late 2010 and peaked in 2011, reflecting growing pressure on those countries’ public finances as well as concerns about the contagious effects of the crisis that began in Greece in 2010 and extended to the Euro area periphery in 2011.  

The intensification of the sovereign debt crisis is also associated with a further change in the level of EU cohesiveness on fiscal policy. In particular, the content of the agreed languages in preparation of the Seoul and Cannes summits reveals that member states agreed on the objective of fiscal sustainability to be attained through ‘fiscal consolidation plans’ (European Council 2010b) whose implementation need to be ‘credible’ (European Council 2011). This high level of cohesiveness largely reflects a renewed convergence of interests among the largest EU member states. In particular, after the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area had erupted, calls by German policymakers for fiscal austerity became more pressing (see Schauble, Financial Times, 5 September 2011). For example, in response to international appeals for fiscal stimuli to support economic growth, German Finance minister Schauble rebutted, ‘You can't cure an alcoholic by giving him alcohol’ (The Independent, 26 September 2011). 

This position was echoed in France where, in contrast to the recent past, fiscal adjustment became a priority for French policymakers, with a view to stemming the contagion effects of the crisis.​[9]​ In November 2011, French prime minister Francois Fillon unveiled one of the toughest austerity plans in France since World War II, stating that ‘We wish to protect the French against the grave problems facing other European countries. Bankruptcy is not an abstract word’ (The Telegraph, 8 November 2011).  As for the UK, the government maintained its support for fiscal consolidation domestically and in Europe. In his speech delivered at the World Economic Forum in 2011, David Cameron argued that ‘Our first priority is to kill off the spectre of massive sovereign debts. Those who argue that dealing with our deficit and promoting growth are somehow alternatives are wrong. You cannot put off the first in order to promote the second…Some countries are again borrowing five, six or seven per cent of GDP again this year. The figure for the UK is more than ten per cent. This is clearly unsustainable and action cannot be put off’ (Cameron 2011).

3.3 Macroeconomic imbalances

On the issue of macroeconomic imbalances that was at the top of the G20 agenda at the Seoul summit in November 2010, the EU found a common position on objectives to be pursued but not on the instruments through which to achieve them. In the EU agreed language, member states concurred that ‘The issue of the rebalancing of world growth also requires particular attention’ and that the exchange rate should not be ‘aimed at gaining short-term competitive advantage’. However, whereas France and the UK supported the US proposal concerning the use of quantitative thresholds to reduce imbalances, based on which the export surpluses of any country should not exceed 4% of its GDP, Germany fiercely resisted this policy instrument (The Economist, 13 November 2010).  

The difficulties in striking a balance among EU member states on how to address global imbalances were noticeable in the letter prepared by Barroso and Van Rompuy and sent to all EU member states in advance of the European Council, where the agreed language for the Seoul summit was expected to be discussed. Indeed, the letter sought without much success to reconcile conflicting preferences, stating that ‘Advanced deficit economies need to seek an increase in their domestic savings rate, while maintaining open markets and enhancing export competitiveness. Emerging surplus economies need to encourage stronger domestic consumption through structural reforms aimed at developing better social safety nets and financial markets, and make progress toward greater flexibility of exchange rate regimes’ (Barroso and Van Rompuy 2010). 

Despite the Commission’s effort, the EU agreed language in preparation for the Seoul summit is interestingly silent on the policy instruments through which to address the problem, although EU Leaders agree that ‘The issue of the rebalancing of world growth also requires particular attention’ (European Council 2010b). The medium level of EU cohesiveness is largely explained by the different preferences of the largest member states on an issue that had limited political salience. Indeed, although macroeconomic imbalances certainly played a role in the building up of the crisis, the crisis was first a financial crisis, later a sovereign debt crisis. In the absence of a full-fledged balance of payments crisis, public attention to the issue was limited, as suggested by Table 1. 

As for the preferences of the three EU member states, the German position was similar to that of China, the other main exporter worldwide. Germany was by far the main surplus country in the EU; its export surplus was estimated at approximately 6% of GDP in 2010. This astonishing export performance was based on the international competiveness of German industry and the relatively low level of domestic demand, which German policymakers refused to boost despite external pressure (Tagesschau, 15 April 2011). Finance Minister Schauble argued that ‘German export successes are not the result of some sort of currency manipulation’ (Der Spiegel, 8 November 2010) and insisted that the macroeconomic position in the Euro area should be assessed as a whole. 

France was critical of macroeconomic imbalances in the EU and internationally. Its position on this issue was  opposite to that of Germany. For example, French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde argued that Germany should consider boosting domestic demand to help deficit countries regain competitiveness and sort out their public finances (Financial Times, 14 March 2010). The UK, which like France had a conspicuous deficit in its balance of payments, called for a solution to the problem of global imbalances. David Cameron presented trade imbalances as ‘a wall of money in the East’ (The Guardian, 11 November 2010, see also Cameron 2010b), arguing that a reduction of global imbalances would promote economic growth in the UK. 

5. Conclusions
 
This paper has investigated the internal cohesiveness of the EU in the G20 Leaders, where the EU is represented through a ‘hybrid’ model. The main findings are that if the preferences of the member states on specific issues are homogenous, EU cohesiveness is high in spite of the absence of ‘exclusive competence’.  Examples include the initial agreement on fiscal stimulus as well as on financial regulation, mainly because UK preferences moved closer to those of Germany and France. If the preferences of the member states are heterogeneous and the issues under discussion are politically salient, the EU is unable to forge a common position on the issues in the G20 agenda. The absence of EU position on the FTT is a case in point. However, and in contrast to the predictions according to which preference heterogeneity largely prevents EU cohesiveness especially when there are not ‘exclusive competence’, preference heterogeneity result in medium cohesiveness if the issue under discussion is not politically salient. This is what happened when the issue of fiscal sustainability entered the G20 agenda at the end of 2009. A similar dynamic was at play on macroeconomic imbalances in preparation for the 2010 Seoul summit (Table 2). 

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

As for the influence exerted by the EU Commission on the formation of the EU common position, the findings reveal that even in a case like the FTT - where the Commission clearly put its weight behind the need to develop such a global tax to regulate the behavior of financial actors - the level of EU cohesiveness was not significantly affected by the Commission’s advocacy. Furthermore, in none of the case studies examined, the Commission played a major role in furthering intra-EU agreement. Previous works on the EU in the G 8 explained how the European Commission was able to ‘emancipate itself within the G8 over time’ due to the ‘the evolving European integration process, and the growing Commission capabilities, standing and entrepreneurship’ (Niemann and Huigens 2011: 420). However, while this is certainly the case in several policy fields, as pointed out by Rommerskirchen (2013: 358) ‘it is difficult to see how any of the EU’s organs has more expertise in economic governance than many of its member states’. Furthermore, the Commission kept a low profile throughout the financial and sovereign debt crises (Hodson 2013). Future research could investigate the influence of the Commission or other member states, for example, in framing issues so as to further internal EU agreement.

 While this study does not claim that its findings can be automatically generalized to all EU external relations, it has nonetheless suggested a number of testable propositions that can be applied to investigate EU cohesiveness in other policy areas as well as in other dimensions, i.e., regional or bilateral rather than global negotiations (on this point Delreux 2014) such as the ongoing negotiations on Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. The main caveat is that in another institutional setting, where the EU has exclusive competence, the impact of preferences heterogeneity and political salience may be different and this constitutes an interesting venue for further research. Furthermore, it is also plausible to think that the coalitional alignments among the MSs that have their own representative within hybrid models of representation impact on the prospect and extent of internal cohesiveness, suggesting an interesting line of further inquiry.

Biographical notes: Manuela Moschella is associate professor in International Political Economy at the Scuola Normale  Superiore di Pisa and Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI). Lucia Quaglia is Professor of Political Science at the University of York. 

Address for correspondence: Manuela Moschella, Scuola Normale Superiore, Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Palazzo Strozzi, Piazza degli Strozzi, 50123 Firenze (IT), manuela.moschella@sns.it (​mailto:manuela.moschella@sns.it​); Lucia Quaglia, Department of Politics, University of York, York YO10 5DD (UK), lucia.quaglia@york.ac.uk

ACKNOLDEGEMENTS

Manuela Moschella gratefully acknowledges the support of the Compagnia di San Paolo Junior Grant, which enabled the research for this paper to be undertaken. Lucia Quaglia wishes to acknowledge financial support from the British Academy and Leverhulme Trust (SG 120191). This article was partly written while she was a Mobility-In fellow at the University of Luxembourg, funded by the Luxembourg Fonds National de la Recherche. We wish to thank Andrea Gideon and Matt Kranke for very professional research assistance. We also wish to thank the reviewers for their insightful comments. All errors and omissions are ours.

NOTES




References 

Barroso, J. M. (2010) Introductory Remarks Ahead of the G8 and G20 Summits, MEMO/10/276, Toronto, 24 June. 

Barroso, J. M. (2010) Remarks at the European Parliament Plenary Debate on the G20 Summit in Seoul, MEMO/10/510, Brussels, 20 October.

Barroso, J. M. and Van Rompuy, H. (2010) Joint Letter on the G20 Summit in Seoul, PCE 250/10, Brussels, 29 October.
 
Barroso, J. M. and Van Rompuy, H. (2011) Joint Letter on the G20 Summit in Cannes, EUCO 93/11, Brussels, 7 October 2011. 

Barroso, J. M. and Van Rompuy, H. (2012) Joint Letter to the EU Heads of State or Government on the G20 Summit in Los Cabos, Mexico, EUCO 96/12, Brussels, 25 May.

Barroso, J. M.  (2009) Declaration on the preparation of the G20 Summit. Speech delivered to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 24 March.

Bertoldi, M., Scherrer H. and Stanoeva G. (2013) The G20@5: Is It Still Delivering?  ECFIN Economic Briefs n°27, November.
 


Bini Smaghi, L. (2004) 'A Single EU Seat in the IMF?', Journal of Common Market Studies 42(2): 229-248. 

Cameron, D. (2011) ‘Speech: PM at the World Economic Forum’, 28 January.

Cameron, D. (2010a) ‘Speech: Transforming the British economy’, 28 May.

Cameron, D. (2010b) ‘Speech: PM at the G20’, 11 November.

Culpepper, P. D. (2011) Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Conceição-Heldt, E.d. (2010) ‘Who controls whom? Dynamics of power delegation and agency losses in EU trade politics’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 48 (4): 1107–26.

Conceição-Heldt, E. d. (2011) 'Variation in Principals’ Preferences and the Agent’s Discretion in the Doha Round', Journal of European Public Policy 18(3): 402-18. 

Conceição-Heldt E.d and Meunier S. (2014) ‘Speaking with a single voice: internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness of the EU in global governance’, Journal of European Public Policy, 21 (7): 961-979.

Delreux, T. (2014) ‘EU actorness, cohesiveness and effectiveness in environmental affairs’, Journal of European Public Policy, 21 (7): 1017-1032.

Dyson, K.H. (2000) The Politics of the Euro-Zone: Stability or Breakdown?, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Elgström, O. and Frenhoff Larsén, M. (2010) 'Free to trade? Commission autonomy in the economic partnership agreement negotiations', Journal of European Public Policy, 17 (2): 205-23.

European Council (2008) Informal Meeting of the Heads of State and Government, Brussels, 7 November.

European Council (2009a) Conclusions, 7880/1/09 REV 1, Brussels, 19-20 March.

European Council (2009b) Informal Meeting of the Heads of State and Government, Brussels, 17 November.

European Council (2010a), Conclusions, EUCO 13/10, Brussels, 17 June.

European Council (2010b) Conclusions, EUCO 25/1/10, Brussels, 28-29 October.

European Council (2011) Conclusions, EUCO 52/1/11, Brussels, 23 October.

European Council (2012) Conclusions, EUCO 4/2/12, Brussels, 1-2 March.

Hodson D. (2011) Governing the Euro Area in Good Times and Bad, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hodson, D. (2013) ‘The little engine that wouldn’t: supranational entrepreneurship and the Barroso Commission (​http:​/​​/​scholar.google.lu​/​citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=4nM4xJUAAAAJ&sortby=pubdate&citation_for_view=4nM4xJUAAAAJ:_kc_bZDykSQC​)’, Journal of European Integration 35 (3), 301-314

House of Lords (2012) Towards a Financial Transaction Tax?, London, 20 March.

Jones, B. D. and Baumgartner, F. R. (2005) The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

London Economics (2014) The Effects of a Financial Transaction Tax on European Households’ Savings, London.

Macaj, G., and Nicolaïdis, K. (2014) 'Beyond ‘one voice’? Global Europe's engagement with its own diversity', Journal of European Public Policy 21(7): 1067-1083. 

Merkel, A. and Sarkozy, N. (2009b) Letter sent to Mirek Topolanek, Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, and José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, 16 March.

Merkel, A. and Sarkozy, N. (2009b) G20 summit joint statement by Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, 1 April.

Meunier, S. (2014) 'Divide and conquer? China and the cacophony of foreign investment rules in the EU', Journal of European Public Policy 21(7): 996-1016.

Meunier, S., and Nicolaïdis, K. (1999) 'Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the EU', Journal of Common Market Studies 37(3): 477-501. 

Moravcsik, A., and Nicolaïdis, K. (1998) 'Federal Ideals and Constitutional Realities in the Treaty of Amsterdam', Journal of Common Market Studies Annual Review: 13-38. 

Moschella, M. (2011) 'Getting hedge funds regulation into the EU agenda: The constraints of agenda dynamics', Journal of European Integration 33 (3): 252-66.

Mügge, D. (2011a) ‘The European presence in global financial governance: A principal-agent perspective’, Journal of European Public Policy 18 (3): 383–402.

Mügge, D. (2011b) ‘From pragmatism to dogmatism: European Union governance, policy paradigms, and financial meltdown’, New Political Economy 16 (2): 185-206.

Nasra S. and Debaere P. (2012) ‘The European Union in the G20: what role for small states?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2012.678304

Niemann, A. and Huigens J. (2011) The European Union's role in the G8: a principal–agent perspective, Journal of European Public Policy, 18:3, 420-442

Pagliari, S. (2013) Public Salience and International Financial Regulation. Explaining the International Regulation of OTC Derivatives, Rating Agencies, and Hedge Funds, Doctoral dissertation, University of Waterloo.

Quaglia, L. (2012) ‘The “old” and “new” politics of financial services regulation in the European Union’, New Political Economy 17 (4): 515-535. 

Quaglia, L. (2010) ‘Completing the Single Market in financial services: The politics of competing advocacy coalitions’, Journal of European Public Policy 17 (7): 1007–22. 

Rommerskirchen, C. (2013) ‘Keeping the Agents Leashed: The EU’s External Economic Governance in the G20’, Journal of European Integration, 35:3, 347-360.

Schauble, W. (2010) ‘Statement by Wolfgang Schäuble Minister of Finance, Bundesministerium der Finanzen, On behalf of Germany’, 24 April.

Schirm, S. (2013) ‘Global politics are domestic politics: a societal approach to divergence in the G20’, Review of International Studies 39 (3): 685-70.

Schäuble, W. (2010), Statement to the International Monetary and Financial Committee, Washington, April 24.

 Wouters J., Van Kerckhoven S., and Odermatt J. (2013) ‘The EU at the G20 and the G20's impact on the EU’,  in Van Vooren, B., Blockmans, S. and Wouters, J. (eds) The EU's Role in Global Governance: The Legal Dimension, Oxford: Oxford University Press .


Table 1 - Political salience of the issues of financial regulation, fiscal policy, and macroeconomic imbalances
N. of articles mentioning 'financial crisis' 5 times
Pre-crisis (2008*)	2008-2009**	2010	2011
4	83	47	26
N. of articles mentioning 'debt crisis' 5 times
Pre-crisis (2008*)	2008-2009**	2010	2011
2	0	56	131
N. of articles mentioning 'balance of payments crisis'
Pre-crisis (2008*)	2008-2009**	2010	2011
4	30	12	18

* January 2008 to October 2008 (before the global financial crisis erupted full force following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers)
** October 2008 (when the global financial crisis erupted full force following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers) to December 2009. 

Table 2: Explaining the levels of EU cohesiveness across G20 Leaders meetings
		Member states’ preferences
		Homogeneous	Heterogeneous
Political Salience	High 	High cohesivenessFinancial regulation (Washington 2008, London 2009, Pittsburgh 2009)Fiscal policy (Seoul 2010, Cannes 2011)	No cohesivenessFTT (Seoul 2010, Cannes 2011, Los Cabos 2012)
	Low 	High cohesivenessFiscal policy (London 2009)	Medium cohesivenessFiscal policy (Pittsburgh 2009, Toronto 2010)Macroeconomic imbalances (Seoul 2010)
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^1	 According to Article 4 TFEU, ‘internal market’ (including financial services) is a ‘shared competence’ of the EU. According to Article 220 TFEU ‘The Union shall establish all appropriate forms of cooperation...with international organisations’. In practice, in areas of shared competence, this is usually done through hybrid models of external representation. But other representation models (e.g. external representation via the Commission) could be chosen by common accord of the member states. Hence, shared competences do not necessarily imply a hybrid model of external representation.
^2	  The draft ‘agreed language’ is usually steered through Council committees and, in particular, through the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) before adoption by the European Council.
^3	  The informal agreement between the Commission and the Council is that the Commission takes the lead in the G20 process because of the primarily economic and financial nature of the issues in the agenda, which form the expertise of the EU Commission (Authors’ interviews with European Commission officials. Brussels, May-June 2014).
^4	  Furthermore, in our case study, there is no variation in the rules and mechanisms through which preferences are aggregated both over time and across.
^5	  Initially negotiated in informal meetings of Heads of State and Government, the agreed language has been incorporated in the Council Conclusions starting with the Toronto summit. 
^6	  http://www.ambafrance-ca.org/Joint-press-conference-with-Angela
^7	  We do not include Washington because in Washington, the G20 was virtually all about financial regulation.
^8	  http://www.ambafrance-ca.org/Joint-press-conference-with-Angela
^9	  Indeed, once the sovereign debt crisis escalated in the periphery of the EU (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and risked extending to Italy, it was clear that France would have been next in line.
